Monthly data on the inflation expectations of financial analysts in the Czech Republic exhibit a tendency for permanent bias and ineffectiveness which violates the rational expectations hypothesis assumed in macroeconomic models. This paper asks whether the surveyed data include any monetary-policy relevant information, in other words, whether the surveyed expectations correspond to the true market expectations, and hence should be reflected in macro models of the Czech economy instead of the rational expectations hypothesis. Using a methodology based on a simple Fisher rule, it is found that the difference between the surveyed and market expectations is not statistically significant.
Introduction
The Czech National Bank runs monthly surveys on the inflation expectations of assumes by the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). 1 We observe a tendency for the permanent overshooting of expectations, and the two series do not follow a common trend, either. In general, there might be doubt about the seriousness of the forecasts. What is remarkable, though, is that in Figure 2 we observe very similar behavior of the money-market price (PRIBOR -Prague
Interbank Offer Rate) and of the surveyed expectations.
Economists and policy-makers should be interested in whether the surveyed data have any information content, i.e., whether the financial analysts'
expectations have any impact on the market activity. On the Czech data we 3 may observe an interesting paradox. In Figure 1 , we can see that the expectations do not have any predictive power for the actual inflation rate.
However, given Figure 2 , it seems the expectations influence the money market activity. Jan00 Jan01 Jan02 Jan03 Jan04 
Figure 2 Comparison of inflation expectations and PRIBOR 1Y
Forming expectations is an essential part of any optimal decision making of any individual. Macroeconomic theory builds on the rational expectation hypothesis.
As can be found in any standars textbook, agents or groups of agents use all the available information, including the costs of the process, as well as they can in their decisions. Certainly, because agents are heterogenous (they face different information utilization costs, they have different information sets available, etc.), expectations about the future differ. For the REH it is important, however, that the expectations are on average (of all individuals) unbiased and efficient, i.e., on the aggregate level the expectations correspond to reality with minor and random differences only.
Recently Mankiw and Wolfers (2003) Figure 1 are inefficient and inconsistent and why they still have predictive power on the price on the Interbank market which ought to be competitive.
In this paper we only deal with the expectations of a single group of people, financial analysts. As such, one would think that what we observe in Figure 1 is irrelevant for judging the applicability of the assumptions of the REH which require we survey a representative sample over all economic agents (households, firms, financial intermediators, etc.). However, this paper is based on the fact that the interbank money market is dominant in the Czech financial system, unlike the US market. The CNB surveys a representative sample of financial analysts who represent the major market-makers on the Czech interbank market. The price the marker-makers create (PRIBOR) strongly influence other financial market prices (credit, swap market prices, etc.). Thus, if the financial analysts' expectations play a role in the determination of PRIBOR, then judging their properties from the REH perspective may be acceptable.
Given the question of interest, the null hypothesis is formulated as that the surveyed expectations are equal to the true market ones. As a common part of any standard macroeconomic model, the Fisher rule is the cornerstone of the methodology employed here. Fama and Gibbons (1982) , Mishkin (1990a) and Mishkin (1990b) provide a motivation for this approach.
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A careful reader will have already noticed that this paper views the money market from the macroeconomic perspective, and that it will be abstracted from the real mechanism of how the market functions, i.e., how the market price is actually formed.
Certainly, the market-makers also take into account other information than inflation forecasts (expectations). One does not know, however, whether the expectations are unintentionally transmitted in to the price via the information that the market-makers utilize or not. In the section of this paper devoted to the interpretation of results, a possible explanation for such a transmission is offered.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The methodology is formulated in the next section. Estimation results and their interpretation follow in section 3, and the fourth section concludes with a discussion of results.
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The Methodology
The methodology developed in this section is structured so that the stated Testing H 0 , similar to Fama and Gibbons (1982) , Mishkin (1990a) and Mishkin (1990b) , the Fisher rule is assumed as the true pricing rule for the money market, i.e.,
where i t m is the nominal interest rate valid from the beginning of period t to t+m, Π t,m e are the true market expectations formed at the beginning of period t for the t+m time horizon, and r t m is the corresponding ex ante real interest rate. As discussed in the introduction, the Fisher rule is assumed in its basic form without a risk premium which is implicitly assumed to be equal to zero.
In a standard way, let us assume that the inflation expectations are based on
information Ω available at time t. Furthermore, following assumptions common to the literature, let us assume that the market inflation expectations at time t for the t+m horizon are equal to the actual inflation rate π t+m , but are subject to disturbances ε t+m . Formally written,
Under the REH it holds that ε t+m is i.i.d. with zero mean and finite variance. If the mean is non-zero, then the expectations are biased. If the expectation error follows a stationary process with zero mean, the expectations are so-called weakly rational. The non-zero autocovariance structure causes only inefficiency of expectations but does not affect their consistency. For test convenience, no particular form of the market expectations will be prescribed, hence they can be both rational or weakly rational.
For our purposes, it is not important to know the exact process unanticipated inflation follows. The objective is to find the relation of the surveyed expectations to the market ones, i.e., whether these two are the same or if there is a difference. Thus, to test the null hypothesis, it is convenient and sufficient to keep the error in expectations in a nearly unspecified form.
Substituting (2) in (1) yields
which can be further rewritten in a more suitable form for the empirical test as
where (putting m=12; we are going to deal with monthly data), φ 0 = E(φ 1 ε t -r t ), and v t = φ 1 ε t -r t -φ 0 = φ 1 (Π t,12 e -π t+12 ) -r t -φ 0 . As indicated, E(ε t ) can be different from zero. 3 Because it is unsure that the market expectation error has a zero mean, no a priori unbiasedness condition on the expectations is imposed.
Without loss of generality, the parameter φ 1 is included. As Mishkin (1990b) shows, the parameter φ 1 does not necessarily need to be equal to 1. Its value depends on the correlation between the inflation expectations and the real interest rate. In this light, φ 1 = 1 counts only for a special case.
Note that for v t in formulation (4), one is not able to separate the real interest rate from the expectation error. It is impossible to distinguish what part of the variation of v t accounts for the unanticipated inflation and what part accounts for the real ex ante interest rate. In other words, one is not even able to extract the error in the market inflation expectations from v t , and to learn the expectations' exact form. That is why the null hypothesis is formulated as below, i.e., there is a correspondence between the surveyed expectations (which are observed) and the market expectations (which are unobservable).
The error term in expression (4), due to its generality, can be written for the market expectations and survey expectations separately:
and 3 In the opposite case, the parameter φ 0 only catches the average ex ante real interest rate.
where ψ 0 and ψ 1 have the same interpretation as φ 0 and φ 1 , respectively, and π t,12 e are the surveyed (observed) financial analysts' inflation expectations. Now the idea of the test is straightforward.
The null hypothesis is formally defined as
where again π t,12 e denotes the surveyed inflation expectations formed at the beginning of period t for the time horizon till t+12, and Π t,12 e are the true market expectations for the same period of time. In the light of H 0 we can see that if it holds, then expressions (5) and (6) must coincide (ψ 0 = φ 0 and ψ 1 = φ 1 ).
Now substituting vv t instead of v t in (4) and rearranging, one obtains i t = (φ 0 −ψ 0 ) +(φ 1 −ψ 1 )π t+12 + ψ 1 π t,12 e + r t .
After further simplification, a final testing expression is generated:
i t = a r + aπ t+12 + bπ t,12 e + ε t .
If the following requirements hold, then one may conclude that π t,12 e = Π t,12 e , or at least they are very close to each other: (i) if ψ 0 = φ 0 and ψ 1 = φ 1 , then it must be that a r =a=0 and (ii) b must be statistically significant and positive.
When performing the test, one ought to be aware of the three major weaknesses the test suffers from. The first concerns the character of disturbances in (8).
By definition they can (i), in the best case, follow a stationary process or (ii), in the worst case, they can contain a unit root. In the former case, the test is still usable. One just has to correct for the autocorrelation effect on the parameters' standard error estimates. The parameters' unbiasedness and consistency property remain unaffected.
In the worst case, when residuals contain a unit root, the test fails because of a spurious regression. This occurrence is not unlikely because if we are aware of the real interest rate being a function of marginal productivity, then for an economy in transition the real interest rate can easily be a non-stationary process. 4 Given this possibility, an essential part of the methodology is to test the disturbances for stationarity. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test are employed.
The second major weakness of the test is the problem of multicollinearity. The occurrence of multicollinearity is very likely, which follows from the nature of the formation of expectations. The closer the expectations are to the REH, the more severe the problem is, since both π t+12 and π t,12 e are regressors.
The third considerable weakness the methodology may suffer from is the problem of joint hypothesis. The problem is that the methodology crucially relies on the assumption that the Fisher rule holds. Thus if it happens the null hypothesis is rejected, one cannot be certain whether it is because the market expectations are truly different from the surveyed ones or because the Fisher rule is invalid. Indeed, this is common to all tests of this type. 5 However, the problem is lessened here. As mentioned in the introductory section, the focus on the problem of inflation expectations is from a macroeconomic perspective, and there the Fisher rule is a standard way to capture the interest rate behavior.
In addition, the results in the next section strongly suggest that the Fisher rule holds.
In summary, to test H 0 , we run the OLS regression of (8) Before moving further, let us discuss the data timing. A period t denotes a month. PRIBOR 1Y is an average of daily rates within the period t. CPI is a measure of the price level within a given period t. The data to construct the CPI are typically collected in the second week of each month. We can roughly think of it as of a monthly price level average. Thus when computing the actual inflation rate one must be careful about the data timing. For our purposes, the year-to-year inflation rate at time t+12 is the relative change in CPI between period t-1 and t+11. Because the information set available to the agents at time t contains only the CPI of t-1 as the latest information about the actual price level, i.e., Ω t = {CPI t-1 ,CPI t-2 ,...}, then when comparing π t,12 e with actual inflation over this period, π t+12 as denoted in equation (8), the actual inflation rate should be computed as π t+12 =1 -(CPI t+11 / CPI t-1 ).
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The Results
First let us draw attention to the critical values of t-tests employed here, which Another reason for simulating the t-test critical values, instead of using the Student's distribution, is also the presence of multicollinearity. Appendix C investigates this issue closely. Because the variance inflation factor (VIF), the measure of the magnitude of collinearity, is 1.52, and a critical value is 10, it is concluded that multicollinearity is not a significant problem. Despite this however, the parameters' standard errors are affected and simulating critical values accounts for it.
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Finally, the results from the estimation of equation (8) are reported in Table 1 and graphically presented in Figure 3 . As follows from the table, the null hypothesis that the market expectations are equal to the surveyed expectations cannot be rejected at the standard level of significance. The parameters a r and a are not significantly different from zero, while the parameter b is found to be significantly different from zero. The goodness of fit is 82% (without accounting for autocorrelation in residuals). Given these results the joint hypothesis problem is not binding. Parameter b is significant and so the model is also significant. Knowing that the estimation results do not suffer from bias or inefficiency, i.e., the model is significant, the residuals' autocorrelation is accounted for, and that there is no multicollinearity problem, the results are somewhat surprising. Given the nature of the interbank money-market, i.e., it is big and highly liquid, one would expect the market expectations to be much more precise than the surveyed ones. In terms of the test, the parameter a should be of a larger value than 0.15. Instead, it is found that, even though the surveyed inflation expectations do not have predictive power for actual inflation, they do not statistically differ from the market expectations. This further suggests that the REH, as understood by macroeconomic theory, is not the best approximation of inflation expectations for the Czech economy.
The surveyed expectations are formed by financial analysts and, in theory, the market expectations should be formed by market dealers who form the market price, i t . In practice, it is more than likely that the dealers do not pay any attention to the analysts' inflation expectations, or rather the dealers do not have any inflation expectations at all. Their particular objective, as professionals, is to maximize their profit and as a result of their actions to meet this criterion, the market price rises. It is surprising that the price PRIBOR 1Y is inefficient from the macroeconomic point of view, i.e., it is based on inefficient inflation expectations. If we admit the idea that the market-makers do not pay attention to inflation forecasts of their own financial analysists, how are the inefficient inflation forecasts that we see in Figure 1 transmitted into the market price?
The character of the Czech interbank money market and the credit market can offer one possible explanation. The credit market is the main channel used to transmit the capital to the economy. Banks (lenders) are the market price setters, and borrowers are price-takers. The price on the credit market is derived from the price on the interbank money market which, in contrast to the credit market, may be considered a competitive one.
For banks as the major lenders of capital, it is profitable to overshoot their inflation forecasts (expectations). If we believe that bankers take into account a nominal depreciation of money when forming the credit price, overshooting these expectations increases their ex post real revenues. Given that the borrowers are price-takers, the overshooting is accepted. Let us assume that a bank on the Czech credit market sets the one-year nominal interest rate on credit so that it is composed of an individual PRIBOR 1Y estimate plus a risk premium and a profit margin. The individual bank's PRIBOR 1Y estimate is composed of a required minimum ex ante real return plus an expected nominal depreciation (expected inflation). Having a price on the credit market, the lenders face a possible lack or excess of loanable funds (deposits from clients).
To utilize them, they are motivated to enter the interbank money market and trade them. Under the assumption that the pricing rule is the same for all banks in the credit market, there will be only a moderate correction in the market PRIBOR in order to make the market clear. The new market PRIBOR is recursively reflected in the price on the credit market.
In this story, the money-market dealers do not necessarily need to know the inflation expectations the market price includes or even how the credit price is formed. They are only "endowed" with an excess or deficit of money which they trade. The deficits or excesses of loanable funds are determined by the credit market, which is exogenous to the interbank money market.
Conclusion
In this paper we find that inefficient surveyed inflation expectations have predictive power on the interest rate and that they do not differ from the market expectations in a significant way. This has crucial consequences for modeling the Czech economy and particularly for optimal monetary policy. As Orphanides and Williams (2002) and Evans and Honkapohja (2002) find, optimal monetary policy differs for an economy where the REH is valid, and for an economy where the expectations do not meet the REH requirements. What is found optimal in the REH world is not optimal in the bounded rationality world, and vice versa. Macroeconomists and policy-makers ought to be aware of this fact.
Appendix A
In this appendix, the methodology for obtaining the critical values reported in the text is outlined. The methodology relies on Monte Carlo experiments. Mishkin (1990b) was the motivation for this approach.
The methodology can be summarized in the few following steps:
1. Analyze the time series of model variables, i.e., PRIBOR 1Y, year-to-year inflation, and inflation expectations, on the unit root.
2. Apply the Box-Jenkins methodology on the data. The outcome ought to be an ARIMA(p,d,q) model with the best fit possible.
3. Simulate the estimated models from the previous step.
4. Using the simulated time series, estimate equation (8), and save the results on the t-tests.
5. Repeat steps 3.) and 4.) 10,000 times.
6. From step 5.) construct a new distribution for critical values.
The simulated critical values are reported in Table 2 . The results for the ADF test are summarized in Table 3 Following Enders (1995) , the ADF test is based on testing H 0 : γ = 0 in The critical values in Table 3are for the 5% level of significance. The null hypotheses of residuals being non-stationary is rejected ( 0 ≠ γ ).
The KPSS test results are summarized in Table 4 . The test statistics are computed for the lag truncation parameter, l, from 0 to 8. As argued by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) , for l=8 the test has the largest power. Including l=0, the test also accounts for autocorrelation. The critical value for the test at the 5% significance level is 0.463. 
Appendix C
In this section the collinearity issue is addressed. First, a formal test for the presence of collinearity is performed. At the same time the test is also a test of the rational expectations hypothesis. Second, the effect of collinearity on parameters' estimates and their standard errors is quantitatively analyzed.
The test of collinearity
The test is standard to the econometric literature. It is based on a variance inflation factor estimation. Because it tests for the linear relationship between π t+12 and π t,12 e , the test is at the same time a test of the REH.
The REH is usually tested on the following inflation-prediction equation:
If the REH holds, parameter c 1 is zero, c 2 is equal to 1, and v t+12 is an i.i.d.
process with zero mean and finite variance. In this case the two variables are evidently collinear.
When the inflation-prediction equation is estimated, 2 R is used to evaluate collinearity. To this purpose a variance inflation factor (VIF) is computed:
Usually, we face a problem of collinearity if VIF>10.
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The estimation results of the inflation-prediction equation are summarized in Table 5 . First, we can see that 0 c 1 ≠ , 1 c 2 ≠ , and the residuals are positively autocorrelated. As a consequence, the REH cannot be accepted. Second, the VIF is 1.5 which is far from the value where collinearity causes estimation problems.
The Quantitative Assessment of the Collinearity Effect on Estimation
Let us derive the estimates } , , { b a a r of equation (8): i t = a r + aπ t+12 + bπ t,12 e + ε t .
To find the estimates of the parameters, the ordinary least-square criteria is used: . Or in a matrix form is the information matrix X'X. To quantitatively analyze the influence of collinearity on the parameters' estimates and t-tests, their values are simulated for different magnitudes of correlation (ρ) between π t+12 and π t,12 e . The analysis is conducted on the set of descriptive statistics summarized in Table 6 . From the graphical results (Figures 4 -6 ) follows that only the parameter a is sensitive to the value of ρ. Its estimate differs considerably for ρ = 0 and ρ = .6
Solving for the parameter estimates gives
and so do the t-statistics. However, what is important here is that the parameter is not statistically significant for ρ =(.5,.9). By the nature of expectations, the correlation between π t,12 e and π t+12 should not be very low, even though the REH does not hold.
The parameter a r is always statistically insignificant and b is statistically significant under the simulation setup. Hence, it might be concluded the results presented in the paper are robust for ρ = (0.5,0.9). Dependence of b and its t-statistics on ρ.
